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Abstract
Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function
can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning
algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The
algorithm is shown to find an ǫ-optimal strategy using sample size linear to the
number of features. To further improve its sample efficiency, we develop an accel-
erated algorithm by adopting techniques such as variance reduction, monotonicity
preservation and two-sided strategy approximation. We prove that the algorithm
is guaranteed to find an ǫ-optimal strategy using no more than O˜(K/(ǫ2(1−γ)4))
samples with high probability, where K is the number of features and γ is a dis-
count factor. The sample, time and space complexities of the algorithm are inde-
pendent of original dimensions of the game.
1 Introduction
Two-player turn based stochastic game (2-TBSG) is a generalization of Markov decision process
(MDP), both of which are widely used models in machine learning and operations research. While
MDP involves one agent with its simple objective to maximize the total reward, 2-TBSG is a zero-
sum game involving two players with opposite objectives: one player seeks to maximize the total
reward and the other player seeks to minimize the total reward. In a 2-TBSG, the set of all states
is divided into two subsets that are controlled by the two players, respectively. We focus on the
discounted stationary 2-TBSG, where the probability transition model is invariant across time and
the total reward is the infinite sum of all discounted rewards. Our goal is to approximate the Nash
equilibrium of the 2-TBSG, whose existence is proved in Shapley (1953).
There are two practical obstacles standing in solving 2-TBSG:
• We usually do not know the transition probability model explicitly;
• The number of possible states and actions are very large or even infinite.
In this paper we have access to a sampling oracle that can generate sample transitions from any state
and action pair. We also suppose that a finite number of state-action features are available, such that
the unknown probability transition model can be embedded using the feature space. These features
allow us to solve 2-TBSG of arbitrary dimensions using parametric algorithms.
A question is raised naturally, that is, how many samples are needed in order to find an ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium? For solving the one-player MDP to ǫ-optimality using K fea-
tures, Yang and Wang (2019) proves an information-theoretic lower bound of sample complexity
Ω(K/((1 − γ)3ǫ2)). Since MDP is a special case of 2-TBSG, the same lower bound applies to
2-TBSG. Yet there has not been any provably efficient algorithm for solving 2-TBSG using features.
To answer this question, we propose two sampling-based algorithms and provide sample complex-
ity analysis. Motivated by the value iteration and Q-learning like algorithms given by Hansen et al.
(2013); Yang and Wang (2019), we propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for solving 2-TBSG
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using given features. When the true transition model can be fully embedded in the feature space
without losing any information, our algorithm finds an ǫ-optimal strategy using no more than
O˜(K/((1 − γ)7ǫ2)) sample transitions, where K is the number of state-action features. We also
provide model misspecification error bound for the case where the features cannot fully embed the
transition model.
To further improve the sample complexity, we use a variance reduction technique, together
with a specifically designed monotonicity preservation technique which were previously used in
Yang and Wang (2019), to develop an algorithm that is even more sample-efficient. This algorithm
uses a two-sided approximation scheme to find the equilibrium value from both above and below.
It computes the final ǫ-optimal strategy by sticking two approximate strategies together. This algo-
rithm is proved to find an ǫ-optimal strategy with high probability using O˜(K/((1−γ)4ǫ2)) samples,
which improves significantly from our first result. Our results are the first and sharpest sample com-
plexity bounds for solving two-player stochastic game using features, to our best knowledges. Our
algorithms are the first ones of their kind with provable sample efficiency. It is also worth noting
that the algorithms are space and time efficient, whose complexities depend polynomially onK and
1
1−γ , and are free from the game’s dimensions.
In Section 2 we review related literatures. Section 3 presents the problem formulation and basics.
We introduce a basic two-player Q-learning algorithm in Section 4 together with its analysis. The
accelerated two-player Q-learning algorithm and its analysis are presented in Section 5 and Section
6.
2 Related Works
The 2-TBSG is a special case of games and stochastic games (SG), which are first introduced in
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007) and Shapley (1953). For a comprehensive introduction on
SG, please refer to the books Neyman et al. (2003) and Filar and Vrieze (2012). A number of deter-
ministic algorithms have been developed for solving 2-TBSG when its explicit form is fully given,
including Littman (1996); Ludwig (1995); Hansen et al. (2013). For example Rao et al. (1973) pro-
poses the strategy iteration algorithm. A value iteration method is proposed by Hansen et al. (2013),
which is one of the motivation of our algorithm.
In the special case of MDP, there exist a large body of works on its sample complexity and sampling-
based algorithms. For the tabular setting (finitely many state and actions), sample complexity
of MDP with a sampling oracle has been studied in Kearns and Singh (1999); Azar et al. (2013);
Sidford et al. (2018b,a); Kakade (2003); Singh and Yee (1994); Azar et al. (2011b). Lower bounds
for sample complexity have been studied in Azar et al. (2013); Even-Dar et al. (2006); Azar et al.
(2011a), where the first tight lower bound Ω(|S||A|/(1 − γ)3) is obtained in Azar et al. (2013).
The first sample-optimal algorithm for finding an ǫ-optimal value is proposed in Azar et al. (2013).
Sidford et al. (2018a) gives the first algorithm that finds an ǫ-optimal policy using the optimal sample
complexity O˜(|S||A|/(1 − γ)3) for all values of ǫ. For solving MDP usingK linearly additive fea-
tures, Yang and Wang (2019) proved a lower bound of sample complexity that isΩ(K/((1−γ)3ǫ2)).
It also provided an algorithm that achieves this lower bound up to log factors, however, their anal-
ysis of the algorithm relies heavily on an extra “anchor state” assumption. In Chen et al. (2018), a
primal-dual method solving MDP with linear and bilinear representation of value functions and tran-
sition models is proposed for the undiscounted MDP. In Jiang et al. (2017), the sample complexity
of contextual decision process is studied.
As for general stochastic games, the minimax Q-learning algorithm and the friend-and-foe Q-
learning algorithm is introduced in Littman (1994) and Littman (2001a), respectively. The Nash
Q-learning algorithm is proposed for zero-sum games in Hu and Wellman (2003) and for general-
sum games in Littman (2001b); Hu and Wellman (1999). Also in Perolat et al. (2015), the error of
approximate Q-learning is estimated. In Zhang et al. (2018), finite-sample analysis of multi-agent
reinforcement learning is provided. To our best knowledge, there is no known algorithm that solves
2-TBSG using features with sample complexity analysis.
There are a large number of works analyzing linear model approximation of value
and Q functions, for examples Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1997); Nedic´ and Bertsekas (2003);
Lagoudakis and Parr (2003); Melo et al. (2008); Parr et al. (2008); Sutton et al. (2009); Lazaric et al.
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(2012); Tagorti and Scherrer (2015). These work mainly focus on approximating the value function
or Q function for a fixed policy. The convergence of temporal difference learning with a linear model
for a given policy is proved in Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1997). Melo et al. (2008) and Sutton et al.
(2009) study the convergence of Q-learning and off-policy temporal difference learning with lin-
ear function parametrization, respectively. In Parr et al. (2008), the relationship of linear transition
model and linear parametrized value functions is explained. It is also pointed out by Yang and Wang
(2019) that using linear model for Q function is essentially equivalent to assuming that the transition
model can be embedded using these features, provided that there is zero Bellman error.
The fitted value iteration for MDPs or 2TBSGs, where the value function is approximated by
functions in a general function space, is analyzed in Munos and Szepesvári (2008); Antos et al.
(2008a,b); Farahmand et al. (2010); Yang et al. (2019); Pérolat et al. (2016). In these papers, it is
shown that the error is related to the Bellman error of the function space, and depends polynomially
on 1/ǫ, 1/(1− γ) and the dimension of the function space. However, only convergence is analyzed
in these paper.
3 Preliminaries
Basics of 2-TBSG A discounted 2-TBSG (2-TBSG for short) consists of a tuple (S,A, P, r, γ),
where S = S1 ∪S2,A = A1 ∪A2 and S1,S2,A1,A2 are state sets and action sets for Player 1 and
Player 2, respectively. P ∈ R|S×A|×|S| is a transition probability matrix, where P (s′|s, a) denotes
the probability of transitioning to state s′ from state s if action a is used. r ∈ R|S|×|A| is the reward
vector, where r(s, a) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the immediate reward received using action a at state s.
For a given state s ∈ S, we use As to denote the available action set for state s. A value function is
a mapping from S to R. A deterministic strategy (strategy for short) π = (π1, π2) is defined such
that π1, π2 are mappings from S1 to A1 and from S2 to A2, respectively. Given a strategy π, the
value function of π is defined to be the expectation of total discounted reward starting from s, i.e.,
V π(s) = E
[
∞∑
i=0
γir(si, π(si))
∣∣∣s0 = s
]
, ∀s ∈ S, (1)
where γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discounted factor, and the expectation is over all trajectories starting from s.
Two players in a 2-TBSG has opposite objectives. While the first player seeks to maximize the value
function (1), the second player seeks to minimize it. In the following we present the definition of
the equilibrium strategy.
Definition 1. A strategy π∗ = (π∗1 , π
∗
2) is called a Nash equilibrium strategy (equilibrium strategy
for short), if V π1,π
∗
2 ≤ V π
∗
≤ V π
∗
1 ,π2 for any player 1’s strategy π1 and player 2’s strategy π2.
The existence of the Nash equilibrium strategy is proved in Shapley (1953). And all equilibrium
strategies share the same value function, which we denote by v∗ ∈ R|S|.
Notice that v∗ is the equilibrium value if and only if it satisfies the following Bellman equation
Hansen et al. (2013):
v∗ = T v∗, (2)
where T is an operator mapping a value function V into another:
T V (s) =
{
maxa∈As [r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
TV ], ∀s ∈ S1,
mina∈As [r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
TV ], ∀s ∈ S2.
(3)
We give definitions of ǫ-optimal values and ǫ-optimal strategies.
Definition 2. We call a value function V an ǫ-optimal value, if ‖V − v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ.
Definition 3. We call a strategy π = (π1, π2) an ǫ-optimal strategy, if for any s ∈ S,
max
π1
[
V π1,π2(s)− v∗(s)
]
≤ ǫ, min
π2
[
V π1,π2(s)− v∗(s)
]
≥ −ǫ.
Sinceminπ2 V
π1,π2 ≤ v∗ ≤ maxπ1 V
π1,π2 , the above definition is equivalent to ‖minπ2 V
π1,π2 −
v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ and ‖maxπ1 V
π1,π2 − v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ.
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Features and Probability Transition Model Suppose we have K feature functions φ =
{φ1, · · · , φK} mapping from S × A into R. For every state-action pair (s, a), these features give a
feature vector
φ(s, a) = [φ1(s, a), · · · , φK(s, a)]
T ∈ RK .
Throughout this paper, we focus on 2-TBSG where the probability transition model can be nearly
embedded using the features φ without losing any information.
Definition 4. We say that the transition model P can be embedded into the feature space φ, if there
exists functions ψ1, . . . , ψK : S 7→ R such that
P (s′|s, a) =
∑
k∈[K]
φk(s, a)ψk(s
′), ∀s′ ∈ S, (s, a) ∈ S ×A.
The preceding model is closely related to linear model for Q functions. When P can be fully
embedded using φ, the Q-functions belong to span{r, φ} so we can parameterize them using K-
dimensional vectors. Note that the feature representation is only concerned with the probability
transition but has nothing to do with the reward function. It is pointed out by Yang and Wang (2019)
that having a transition model which can be embedded into φ is equivalent to using linear Q-function
model with zero Bellman error. In our subsequent analysis, we also provide approximation guaran-
tee when P cannot be fully embedded using φ.
It is worth noting that Definition 4 has a kernel interpretation. It is equivalent to that the left sin-
gular functions of P belong to the Hilbert space with the kernel function K((s, a), (s′, a′)) =
φ(s, a)Tφ(s′, a′). Our model and method can be viewed as approximating and solving the 2-TBSG
in a given kernel space.
Notations For two value functions V1, V2, we use V1 ≤ V2 to denote V1(s) ≤ V2(s), ∀s ∈ S.
We use
∏
[a,b] V (s) to denote the projection of V (s) into the interval [a, b]. The total variance
(TV) distance between two distributions P1, P2 on the state space S is defined as ‖P1 − P2‖TV =∑
s∈S |P1(s)− P2(s)|. And we use O˜(·) to hide log factors ofK,L, ǫ, 1− γ and δ.
4 A Basic Two-Player Q-learning Algorithm
In this section, we develop a basic two-player Q learning algorithm for 2-TBSG. The algorithm is
motivated by the two-player value iteration algorithm Hansen et al. (2013). It is also motivated by
the parametric Q-learning algorithm for solving MDP given by Yang and Wang (2019).
4.1 Algorithm and Parametrization
The algorithm uses a vector w ∈ RK to parametrize Q-functions, value functions and strategies as
follows:
Qw(s, a) = r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)
Tw,
Vw(s) =
{
maxa∈AQw(s, a) s ∈ S1,
mina∈AQw(s, a) s ∈ S2,
πw(s) =
{
argmaxa∈AQw(s, a) s ∈ S1,
argmina∈AQw(s, a) s ∈ S2.
(4)
The algorithm keeps tracks of the parameter vector w only. The value functions and strategies can
be obtained from w according to preceding equations when they are needed.
We present Algorithm 1, which is an approximate value iteration. Our algorithm picks a set K of
representative state-action pairs at first. Then at iteration t, it uses sampling to estimate the values
P (·|s, a)TVw(t−1) , and carries value iteration using these estimates. The set K can be chosen nearly
arbitrarily, but it is necessary that the set is representative of the feature space. It means that the
feature vectors of state-action pairs in this set cannot too be alike but need to be linearly independent.
Assumption 1. There existK state-action pairs (s, a) forming a set K satisfying
‖φ(s, a)‖1 ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ As, ∃L > 0, ‖Φ
−1
K ‖∞ ≤ L,
where ΦK is theK ×K matrix formed by row features of those (s, a) in K.
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Algorithm 1 Sampled Value Iteration for 2-TBSG
1: Input: A 2-TBSGM = (S ,A, P, r, γ), where S = S1 ∪ S2,A = A1 ∪ A2.
2: Input: ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1).
3: Initialize: w(0) ← 0.
4: Initialize: R← Θ(1/(1− γ) log(1/(1− γ)ǫ)), T ← Θ
[(
L2 · log(KR/δ)/(ǫ2(1− γ)6)
)]
.
5: Pick a set K of state-action pairs, which satisfies Assumption 1.
6: for t = 1 : R do
7: M (t) ← 0 ∈ RK
8: for (s, a) ∈ K do
9: Sample P (·|s, a) for T times to obtain s
(t)
1 , · · · , s
(t)
T ∈ S .
10: LetM (t)(s, a) = 1
T
∑T
i=1 Π[0,1/(1−γ)]Vw(t−1) (s
(t)
i ), where Vw is defined in (4).
11: end for
12: w(t) ← Φ−1K M
(t).
13: end for
14: Output: w(R) ∈ RK .
4.2 Sample Complexity Analysis
The next theorem establishes the sample complexity of Algorithm 1, which is independent from |S|
and |A|. Its proof is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 1 (Convergence of Algorithm 1). Let Assumption 1 holds. Suppose that the transition
model P of M can be fully embedded into the φ space. Then for some ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), with
probability at least 1− δ, the parametrized strategy πw(R) according to the output of Algorithm 1 is
ǫ-optimal. The number of samples used is O˜
(
KL2
(1−γ)7ǫ2 · poly log(Kǫ
−1δ−1)
)
.
5 Variance-Reduced Q-Learning for Two-Player Stochastic Games
In this section, we show how to accelerate the two-player Q-learning algorithm and achieve near-
optimal sample efficiency. A main technique is to leverage monotonicity of the Bellman operator to
guarantee that solutions improvemonotonically in the algorithm, which was used in Yang and Wang
(2019).
5.1 Nonnegative Features
To preserve monotonicity in the algorithm, we assume without loss of generality the features are
nonnegative:
φk(s, a) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ [K], ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A
This condition can be easily satisfied. If the raw features φ does not satisfy nonnegativity, we can
construct new features φ′ to make it satisfied. For any state-action pair (s, a) we append another 1D
feature φ′K+1(s, a) such that φ
′
k(s, a) = φk(s, a) + φ
′
K+1(s, a) ≥ 0 for k ∈ [K], and there is a
subset K′ of S ×A such that |K′| = K + 1 and Φ′K′ is nonsingular. Then φ
′ satisfies nonnegativity
condition and Assumption 1 for some L by normalization. More details are deferred to appendix.
5.2 Parametrization
We use a “max-linear" parameterization to guarantee that value functions improve monotonically in
the algorithm. Instead of using a single vector w, we now use a finite collection of K-dimensional
vectors θ = {w(h)}Zh=1, where Z is an integer of order 1/(1− γ). We use the following parameteri-
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zation for the Q-functions, the value functions and strategies1:
Qw(h)(s, a) = r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)
Tw(h),
Vθ(s) =
{
maxh∈[Z] maxa∈As Qw(h)(s, a), ∀s ∈ S1,
maxh∈[Z] mina∈As Qw(h)(s, a), ∀s ∈ S2,
πθ(s) =
{
maxh∈[Z] [argmaxa∈As (Qw(h)(s, a))] , ∀s ∈ S1,
maxh∈[Z] [argmina∈As (Qw(h)(s, a))] , ∀s ∈ S2.
(5)
For a given θ and s, computing the corresponding Q-value and action requires solving a one-step op-
timization problem. We assume that there is an oracle that solves the problem with time complexity
M .
Remark 1. When the action space is continuous, this M may become a constant which is indepen-
dent to the state set and the action set.
5.3 Preserving Monotonicity
A drawback of value iteration-like method is: an ǫ-optimal value function cannot be used greedily
to obtain an ǫ-optimal strategy. In order for Algorithm 1 to find an π such that V π is an ǫ-optimal
value, it needs to find an (1− γ)ǫ-optimal value function first, which is very inefficient. However, if
a strategy π and a value function V satisfy following inequality
V ≤ TπV, (6)
then there is a strong connection between V π and V as follows (due to monotonicity of the Bellman
operator T ):
V ≤ TπV ≤ T
2
π V ≤ · · · ≤ T
∞
π V = V
π.
This relation will be used to show that if V is close to optimal, the policy π is also close to optimal.
The accelerated algorithm is given partly in Algorithm 2, which uses two tricks to preserve mono-
tonicity:
• We use parametrization (5) for Qw, Vθ and πθ . This parametrization ensures that in our
algorithm, the values and strategies keeps improving throughout iterations.
• In each iteration, we shift downwards the new parameter w(i,j) to w(i,j) by using a confi-
dence bound, such that
φ(s, a)Tw(i,j) ≤ P (·|s, a)TV (i,j−1) ≤ P (·|s, a)TV (i,j),
which uses the nonnegativity of features. The shift is used to guarantee (6).
5.4 Approximating the Equilibrium from Two Sides
Making value functions monotonically increasing is not enough to find an ǫ-optimal strategy for
two-player stochastic games. There are two sides of the game, and V π may be either greater or less
than the Nash value. Having a lowerbound V for V π does not lead to an approximate strategy. This
is a major difference from one-player MDP.
In order to fix this problem, we approximate the Nash equilibrium from two sides – both from above
and below. Given player 1’s strategy π1 and player 2’s strategy π2, we introduce two Bellman
operators Tπ1,min, Tmax,π2 .
Tπ1,minV =
{
r(s, π1(s)) + γP (·|s, π1(s))
TV, if s ∈ S1,
mins∈As
[
r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TV
]
, if s ∈ S2,
Tmax,π2V =
{
maxs∈As
[
r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TV
]
, if s ∈ S1,
r(s, π2(s)) + γP (·|s, π2(s))
TV, if s ∈ S2.
(7)
Then if there exist value functions V,W such that all of the following
V ≤ Tπ1,minV, Tmax,π2W ≤W (8)
1Here maxh∈[Z][argmina∈As Qw(h) (s, a)] is defined to be the solution of a in the max-min problem:
maxh∈[Z] mina∈As Qw(h) (s, a). The definition ofmaxh∈[Z][argmaxa∈As Qw(h) (s, a)] is similar.
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hold, then by using the monotonicity of Tπ1,min, Tπ2,max we get
V ≤ min
π2
V π1,π2 ≤ v∗ ≤ max
π1
V π1,π2 ≤W.
Hence if we have ‖V − v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ and ‖W − v
∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ, they jointly imply
‖min
π2
V π1,π2 − v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ,
‖max
π1
V π1,π2 − v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ,
(9)
which indicates that (π1, π2) is an ǫ-optimal strategy.
To achieve this goal, we construct a “flipped" instance of 2-TBSGM′ = (S,A, P, r′, γ), where the
state set and the action set for each player, the transition probability matrix and the discounted factor
are identical with those ofM. The reward function r′ is defined as
r′(s, a) = 1− r(s, a). (10)
And the objective of two players are switched, which means inM′ the first player aims to minimize
and the second player aims to maximize.M,M′ share the same optimal strategy (but flipped).
We use V ′ to denote the value function of M′, and let W (s) = 11−γ − V
′(s) for any s ∈ S,
which serves as the value function approximating the equilibrium value v∗ from upper side. ThisW ,
together with V , forms a two-sided approximation to the equilibrium value function.
We use Algorithm 2 to solveM andM′ at the same time. Next we construct a strategy π where
the first player’s strategy is based on parameters from the lower approximation, and the second
player’s strategy is based on parameters from the upper approximation. This process is described in
Algorithm 3, and its output is the following approximate Nash equilibrium strategy:
π(s) =
{
πθ(R′,R)(s), if s ∈ S1,
π′
η(R′ ,R)
(s), if s ∈ S2,
(11)
where for η = {z(h)}Zh=1, π
′ is the strategy defined as
π′η(s) =
{
maxh∈[Z]
[
argmina∈As
(
r′(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T z(h)
)]
, ∀s ∈ S1,
maxh∈[Z]
[
argmaxa∈As
(
r′(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T z(h)
)]
, ∀s ∈ S2,
5.5 Variance Reduction
We use inner-outer loops for variance reduction in Algorithm 2. Let the parameters at the (i, j)-th it-
eration be θ(i,j). At the beginning of the i-th outer iteration, we aim to approximateP (·|s, a)TVθ(i,0)
accurately (Step 6, 7). Then in the (i, j)-th inner iteration, we use P (·|s, a)TVθ(i,0) as a reference to
reduce the variance of estimation. That is, we estimate the difference P (·|s, a)T (Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0))
using samples and then use the following equation (Step 11, 12)
P (·|s, a)TVθ(i,j−1) = P (·|s, a)
TVθ(i,0) + P (·|s, a)
T (Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0))
to approximate P (·|s, a)TVθ(i,j−1) . Since the infinite norm of (Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0)) is guaranteed to
be smaller than the absolute value of Vθ(i,0) , the number of samples needed for each inner iteration
can be substantially reduced. Hence our algorithm is more sample-efficient.
5.6 Putting Together
Algorithms 2-3 puts together all the techniques that were explained. In the next section, we will
prove that they output an ǫ-optimal strategy with high probability. It is easy to see that the time
complexity of Algorithm 2 is O˜(Kω +MK/((1− γ)4ǫ2) +K2/(1− γ)). The first termKω is the
time calculating Φ−1K . The second term is the time of sampling and calculating the value function
in each iteration, and M is the time of calculating Vθ(s) given parameter θ and state s, which can
be viewed as solving an optimization problem over the action space. The last term is due to the
calculation of ΦKM
(i,j). As for the space complexity, we only need to store Φ−1K and the parameter
θ(i,j) at each iteration, which take O˜(K2 + K/(1 − γ)) space. Hence the total time and space
complexities are independent from the numbers of states and actions.
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Algorithm 2 One-side Parametric Q-Learning with Variance Reduction for 2-TBSG
1: Input: A two-TBSGM = (S ,A, P, r, γ) with feature map φ, where S = S1 ∪ S2,A = A1 ∪A2
2: Input: ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1)
3: Initialize:
R′ ← Θ(log 1/(ǫ(1− γ))), R← Θ(R′/(1− γ)), θ(0,0) ← {0} ∈ RK
m← Θ(L2 log(R′RKδ−1)/(ǫ2(1− γ)4)), m1 ← Θ(L
2 log(R′RKδ−1)/((1− γ)2)),
ǫ1 ← Θ[L/(1− γ) ·
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)/m],
ǫ(i) ← ǫ1 +Θ[L · 2
−i/(1− γ)
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)/m1], ∀0 ≤ i ≤ R
4: for i = 0, 1, · · · , R′ do
5: for k ∈ [K] do
6: Generate state samples x
(1)
k , · · · , x
(m)
k ∈ S from P (·|sk, ak) for (sk, ak) ∈ K.
7: LetM (i,0)(k)← 1
m
∑m
l=1 Vθ(i,0) (x
(l)
k )
8: end for
9: for j = 1, · · · , R do
10: for k ∈ [K] do
11: Generate state samples x
(1)
k , · · · , x
(m1)
k ∈ S from P (·|sk, ak) for (sk, ak) ∈ K.
12: LetM (i,j)(k)← 1
m1
∑m1
l=1
(
Vθ(i,j−1) (x
(l)
k )− Vθ(i,0)(x
(l)
k )
)
+M (i,0)
13: end for
14: w(i,j) ← Φ−1
K
M (i,j)
15: w(i,j)(k)← w(i,j)(k)− ǫ(i), ∀k ∈ [K]
16: θ(i,j) ← θ(i,j−1) ∪ {w(i,j)}
17: end for
18: θ(i+1,0) ← θ(i,R)
19: end for
20: Output: θ(R
′,R)
Algorithm 3 Two-side Parametric Q-Learning with Variance Reduction
1: Input: A two-TBSGM = (S ,A, P, r, γ) with feature map φ, where S = S1 ∪ S2,A = A1 ∪A2
2: Input: ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1)
3: ConstructM′ = (S ,A, P, 1− r, γ) where objectives of two players are switched
4: Solve θ(R
′,R) using Algorithm 2 with inputM and ǫ, δ
5: Solve η(R
′,R) using Algorithm 2 with inputM′ and ǫ, δ
6: Construct a strategy π : S → A:
π(s) =
{
π
θ(R
′,R)(s), ∀s ∈ S1,
π′
η(R
′,R)(s), ∀s ∈ S2.
(12)
7: Output: π
6 Sample Complexity of Algorithms 2-3
In this section, we analyze the sample complexity of our Algorithms 2-3.
Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and let features be nonnegative. Suppose that the transition
modelP ofM can be fully embedded into φ space. Then for some ǫ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability
at least 1 − 2δ, the output of Algorithm 3 is an ǫ-optimal strategy. The number of samples used is
N = O
(
KL2
(1−γ)4ǫ2 · poly log(Kǫ
−1δ−1)
)
.
We present a proof sketch here, and the complete proof is deferred to appendix.
Proof Sketch. We prove ‖Vθ(i,0) − v
∗‖∞ ≤ 2
−i/(1 − γ) by induction. It is easy to know that
‖Vθ(0,0) − v
∗‖∞ ≤ 1/(1− γ). Next we assume ‖Vθ(i−1,0) − v
∗‖∞ ≤ 2
−i+1/(1− γ) holds.
The error between Vθ(i,0) and v
∗ involves two types of error: the estimation error due to sampling
and the convergence error of value iteration. Due to the variance reduction technique, estimation
error has two parts. The first part is the estimation error of Φ−1K PKVθ(i−1,0) , which we denote as
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ǫ(i,0), and the second part is the error of Φ−1K PK(Vθ(i−1,j) − Vθ(i−1,0)), which we denote as ǫ
(i,j) for
short.
According to the Hoeffding inequality, we have ǫ(i,0) = O˜(L/(1− γ) ·
√
1/m) and ǫ(i,j) = O˜(L ·
maxs |Vθ(i−1,j−1)(s) − Vθ(i−1,0)(s)| ·
√
1/m1) with high probability. By the induction hypothesis,
we havemaxs |Vθ(i−1,j−1) (s)−Vθ(i−1,0)(s)| ≤
1
2i−1(1−γ) . If we choosem = cL
2/((1− γ)4ǫ2) and
m1 = c1L
2/(1− γ)2, we will have ǫ(i,0) = O(ǫ(1 − γ)) and ǫ(i,j) = O(2−i).
The convergence error of value iteration in the inner loop is γR/(1 − γ). If we choose R =
cR log(ǫ
−1(1 − γ)−1)/(1 − γ), we will have γR/(1 − γ) = O(ǫ). Bringing these two types of
errors together, we have with high probability that
‖v∗ − Vθ(i,0)‖∞ ≤ γ
R/(1− γ) +
R∑
j=1
γR−j · (ǫ(i,0) + ǫ(i,j))
≤ O
(
ǫ+ (ǫ(1− γ) + 2−i)/(1− γ)
)
= O
(
2−i/(1− γ)
)
,
where the last equality is due to ǫ ≤ 2−R
′
/(1− γ) ≤ 2−i/(1− γ). ChoosingR′ = cR′ log(ǫ
−1(1−
γ)−1), we have ‖v∗−Vθ(R′,R)‖∞ = ‖v
∗−Vθ(R+1,0)‖∞ ≤ ǫ. Here we have omitted the dependence
on any constant factors.
Similarly, we can show ‖v∗ −Wη(R+1,0)‖∞ ≤ ǫ for the “flipped" side. Hence we have Vθ(R′,R) ≤
v∗ ≤ Wη(R′,R) , therefore the combined strategy π = (π1, π2) given by Algorithm 3 is an ǫ-optimal
strategy since
Vθ(R′,R) ≤ minπ2
V π1,π2 ≤ v∗ ≤ max
π1
V π1,π2 ≤Wη(R,R′) , (13)
whose proof is based on the monotonicity of two operators Tπ1,min, Tmax,π2 . The total number of
samples used by Algorithm 3 is R′(R ·m1 +m) = O˜(L
2/((1− γ)4ǫ2)).
According to Theorem 1 and 2, we have the following theorem when the transition model cannot be
embedded exactly, whose proof is deferred to appendix.
Theorem 3 (Approximation error due to model misspecification). Let Assumption 1 holds and let
features be nonnegative. If there is an another transition model P˜ which can be fully embedded into
φ space, and there exists ξ ∈ [0, 1] such that ‖P (·|s, a)− P˜ (·|s, a)‖TV ≤ ξ for ∀(s, a) ∈ S×A and
P (·|s, a) = P˜ (·|s, a) for (s, a) ∈ K, then with probability at least 1 − 2δ, the output of Algorithm
3 is an
(
2ξ/(1− γ)2 + 2ǫ
)
-optimal strategy, and with probability at least 1 − δ, the parametrized
strategy (π1
w(R)
, π2
w(R)
) according to the output of Algorithm 1 is
(
2ξ/(1− γ)2 + 2ǫ
)
-optimal.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a two-player Q-learning algorithm for solving 2-TBSG in feature space.
This algorithm is proved to find an ǫ-optimal strategy with high probability using O˜(K/((1−γ)4ǫ2))
samples. It is the first and sharpest sample complexity bound for solving two-player stochastic game
using features and linear models, to our best knowledges. The algorithm is sample efficient as well
as space and time efficient.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We first present the definition of optimal counterstrategies.
Definition 5. For player 1’s strategy π1, we call π2 a player 2’s optimal counterstrategy against
π1, if for any player 2’s strategy π2, we have V
π1,π2 ≤ V π1,π2 . For player 2’s strategy π2, we
call π1 a player 1’s optimal counterstrategy against π2, if for any player 1’s strategy π1, we have
V π1,π2 ≥ V π1,π2 .
It is known in Puterman (2014) that for any player 1’s strategy π1 (player 2’s strategy π2), the optimal
counterstrategy against π1 (π2) always exists.
Our next lemma indicates that we can use the error of parametrizedQ functions to bounded the error
of value functions of parametrized strategies.
Lemma 1. If
‖Qw(s, a)−Q
∗(s, a)‖∞ ≤ ζ, (14)
then we have
‖vπ1,π
∗
2 − v∗‖∞ ≤
2ζ
1− γ
, ‖vπ
∗
1 ,π2 − v∗‖∞ ≤
2ζ
1− γ
, (15)
where (π1, π2) = πw, and π
∗
1 , π
∗
2 are optimal counterstrategies of π2, π1.
Proof. We only prove the first inequality of (15). The proof of the second inequality is similar.
For any s ∈ S1,
|vπ1,π
∗
2 (s)− v∗(s)| = |vπ1,π
∗
2 (s)−Q∗(s, π∗(s))|
≤ |vπ1,π
∗
2 (s)−Q∗(s, π1(s))|+ |Q
∗(s, π1(s))−Q
∗(s, π∗(s))|
= |γP (·|s, π1(s))v
π1,π
∗
2 − γP (·|s, π1(s))v
∗|+ |Q∗(s, π1(s)) −Q
∗(s, π∗(s))|
≤ γ|P (·|s, π1(s))(v
π1,π
∗
2 − v∗)|+ |Q∗(s, π1(s))−Q
∗(s, π∗(s))|
≤ γ‖vπ1,π
∗
2 − v∗‖∞ + |Q
∗(s, π1(s))−Q
∗(s, π∗(s))|.
According to the definition of πw = (π1, π2) andQ
∗,
Q∗(s, π1(s)) ≤ Q
∗(s, π∗(s)),
Qw(s, π1(s)) ≥ Qw(s, π
∗(s)).
Combine this inequality with inequality (14), we get
0 ≤ Q∗(s, π∗(s))−Q∗(s, π1(s))
≤ |Q∗(s, π∗(s)) −Qw(s, π
∗(s))|+Qw(s, π
∗(s))−Qw(s, π1(s))
+ |Qw(s, π1(s)) −Q
∗(s, π1(s))|
≤ 2‖Qw −Q
∗‖∞ ≤ 2ζ,
which indicates that
|vπ1,π
∗
2 (s)− v∗(s)| ≤ γ‖vπ1,π
∗
2 − v∗‖∞ + 2ζ, ∀s ∈ S1.
Furthermore, for s ∈ S2, we have
|vπ1,π
∗
2 (s)− v∗(s)| = min
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TV π1,π
∗
2
]
− min
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TV ∗
]
≤ max
a∈As
[
γP (·|s, a)TV π1,π
∗
2 − γP (·|s, a)TV ∗
]
≤ γ‖vπ1,π
∗
2 − v∗‖∞.
Therefore, we have
‖vπ1,π
∗
2 − v∗‖∞ ≤ γ‖v
π1,π
∗
2 − v∗‖∞ + 2ζ,
which indicates that
‖vπ1,π
∗
2 − v∗‖∞ ≤
2ζ
1− γ
.
The first inequality of (15) is verified.
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Proof of Theorem 1. We define
T V (s) =
{
maxa∈As r(s, a) + γP
T
s,aV, ∀s ∈ S1,
mina∈As r(s, a) + γP
T
s,aV, ∀s ∈ S2,
Tˆ (t)V (s) =
{
maxa∈As r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)
TΦ−1K Pˆ
(t)
K V, ∀s ∈ S1,
mina∈As r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)
TΦ−1K Pˆ
(t)
K V, ∀s ∈ S2,
where Pˆ (t) ∈ RK×|S| (1 ≤ t ≤ R) is the approximate transition probability matrix obtained by
sampling at t-th iterations:
Pˆ
(t)
(s,a),s′ =
1
T
T∑
i=1
1
[s
(t)
i =s
′]
, ∀(s, a) ∈ K, s
(t)
1 , · · · , s
(t)
T ∼ P (·|s, a).
Then our algorithm can be written as
Vw(t) ← Tˆ
(t)Vˆw(t−1) , ∀1 ≤ l ≤ R,
where Vˆw(t−1) = Π[0,1/(1−γ)]Vw(t−1) .
We define the following event as Et:
‖(Pˆ
(t)
K − PK)Vˆwt−1‖∞ ≤ ǫ1 := c ·
1
1− γ
√
log(KR/δ)
T
.
According to Hoeffding inequality for both state-action pairs in K and applying their union bound,
the event Et holds with probability at least 1 − δ/R. Also Et indicates that for any s ∈ S, a ∈ As,
we have∣∣∣γφ(s, a)TΦ−1K Pˆ (t)K Vˆw(t−1) − γPTs,aVˆw(t−1) ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣φ(s, a)TΦ−1K (Pˆ (t)K − PK)Vˆw(t−1) ∣∣∣ ≤ Lǫ1, (16)
where we let Ps,a = P (·|s, a) and the last inequality comes from the assumption ‖φ(s, a)‖1 ≤ 1
and ‖Φ−1K ‖∞ ≤ L. Noting that for any s ∈ S,
|[Tˆ (t)Vˆw(t−1) ](s)− [T Vˆw(t−1) ](s)| ≤ max
a∈As
∣∣∣γφ(s, a)TΦ−1K Pˆ (t)K Vˆw(t−1) − γPTs,aVˆw(t−1) ∣∣∣ ,
and T v∗ = v∗, we have
‖Vw(t) − v
∗‖∞ ≤ ‖Tˆ
(t)Vˆw(t−1) − T Vˆw(t−1)‖∞ + ‖T Vˆw(t−1) − T v
∗‖∞
≤ Lǫ1 + ‖T Vˆw(t−1) − T v
∗‖∞
≤ Lǫ1 + γ‖Vˆw(t−1) − v
∗‖∞,
where in the last inequality we use the contraction property of T .
Therefore, when E(1), · · · , E(R) all hold, we get
‖Vw(R) − V
∗‖∞ ≤ Lǫ1 + γ‖Vˆw(R−1) − v
∗‖∞
≤ Lǫ1 + γ‖Vw(R−1) − v
∗‖∞
≤ γ · Lǫ1 + Lǫ1 + γ
2‖Vˆw(R−2) − v
∗‖∞
≤ · · ·
≤
γ
1− γ
· Lǫ1 +
γR
1− γ
,
where we use the fact ‖Vw(0) −V
∗‖∞ ≤ 1/(1− γ) in the last inequality. Furthermore, according to
Qw(R)(s, a) = r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)
TΦ−1K Pˆ
(R)
K Vˆw(R−1) , we have
‖Qw(R) −Q
∗‖∞ ≤ Lǫ1 + γ‖Vˆw(R−1) − v
∗‖∞ ≤
γ · Lǫ1
1− γ
+
γR
1− γ
,
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when E(R) holds, similar to the derivation in (16). Finally if we suppose π1w(R) , π
2
w(R) are optimal
counterstrategies against π2
w(R)
, π1
w(R)
, using Lemma 1 we get
∥∥∥V π1w(R) ,π2w(R) − V ∗∥∥∥
∞
≤
2γ · Lǫ1
(1− γ)2
+
2γR
(1− γ)2∥∥∥V π1w(R) ,π2w(R) − V ∗∥∥∥
∞
≤
2γ · Lǫ1
(1− γ)2
+
2γR
(1− γ)2
if events E1, · · · , ER all hold. Since every Et holds with probability at least 1− δ/R, the probability
when all these events hold is at least 1− δ.
Hence if we choose
R =
1
1− γ
log
1
ǫ(1− γ)
, ǫ1 = O
(
ǫ(1− γ)2
L
)
, T = O
(
log(KR/δ)
ǫ21(1 − γ)
2
)
= O
(
L2 · log(KR/δ)
ǫ2(1− γ)6
)
,
we can obtain a strategy π(R) such that∥∥∥V π1w(R) ,π2w(R) − V ∗∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ,
∥∥∥V π1w(R) ,π2w(R) − V ∗∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ
with probability at least 1− δ. And the number of samples required is
T · R · k = O˜
(
kL2
ǫ2(1− γ)7
)
.
B Construction of Non-negative Feature
In this section, we discuss how to construct nonnegative features such that the Assumption 1 holds.
Theorem 4. Suppose the transition model P can be embedded into φ. If there exists a setK of state-
action pair such that |K| = K and ΦK is nonsingular, then we can construct dimension-(k + 1)
nonnegative features φ′(s, a) for every state action pairs (s, a) such that P can also be embedded
into φ′, and Assumption 1 holds for a state-action pair set K′ and some constant L.
We first present a lemma which is useful in proving Theorem 4.
Lemma 2. If A is a non-singular matrix and k ∈ [K], and A′(l) is the following matrix
A′(l)i,j =
{
Ai,j + l, if i = k;
Ai,j , if i 6= k.
Then for anyN > 0, there exists l > N such that A′(l) is non-singular.
Proof. This lemma directly follows from the fact that det(A′(l)) is a linear function of l.
Proof of Theorem 4. We construct a feature map L from φ′(s, a) to φ(s, a) in the following way.
L
(
[φ′1(s, a), φ
′
2(s, a), · · · , φ
′
K(s, a), φ
′
K+1(s, a)]
)
= [φ′1(s, a)− φ
′
K+1(s, a), φ
′
2(s, a)− φ
′
K+1(s, a), · · · , φ
′
K(s, a)− φ
′
K+1(s, a)]
= [φ1(s, a), φ2(s, a), · · · , φK(s, a)],
(17)
which means φk(s, a) = φ
′
k(s, a)− φ
′
K+1(s, a) for any k ∈ [K]. Adopting this feature map, P can
be embedded into φ′. Hence we only need to construct nonnegative features φ′ satisfying both (17)
and Assumption 1.
For any (s, a) there exists N(s, a) such that for any φ′K+1(s, a) ≥ N(s, a), we have φk(s, a) +
φ′K+1(s, a) ≥ 0 for any k ∈ [K]. We choose arbitrarily a state-action pair (s
′, a′) not in K, and
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let K′ to be the union of K and {(s′, a′)}. If we choose φ′K+1(s
′, a′) > max{0, N(s′, a′)} and
φ′k(s
′, a′) = φk(s
′, a′) + φ′K+1(s
′, a′), we will have
det


φ1(s1, a1) · · · φK(s1, a1) 0
φ1(s2, a2) · · · φK(s2, a2) 0
...
. . .
...
...
φ1(sK , aK) · · · φK(sK , aK) 0
φ′1(s
′, a′) · · · φ′K(s
′, a′) φ′K+1(s
′, a′)

 6= 0
since ΦK is nonsingular, where K = {(s1, a1), · · · , (sK , aK)}. Next for k ∈ [K], we iteratively
choose φ′K+1(sk, ak) ≥ N(sk, ak) and add it to the k-th row of the feature matrix Φ
′
K′ such that
the matrix is still nonsingular. (According to Lemma 2, such φ′K+1(sk, ak) exists.) After these K
operations, we have
detΦ′K′ = det


φ′1(s1, a1) · · · φ
′
K(s1, a1) φ
′
K+1(s1, a1)
φ′1(s2, a2) · · · φ
′
K(s2, a2) φ
′
K+1(s2, a2)
...
. . .
...
...
φ′1(sK , aK) · · · φ
′
K(sK , aK) φ
′
K+1(sK , aK)
φ′1(s
′, a′) · · · φ′K(s
′, a′) φ′K+1(s
′, a′)

 6= 0,
where φ′k(sk, ak) = φk(sk, ak) + φ
′
K+1(sk, ak). This indicates that Φ
′
K′ is nonsingular. Next for
(s, a) not in K′, we choose φ′K+1(s, a) = N(s, a) and let φ
′
k(s, a) = φk(s, a) + φ
′
K+1(s, a).
Then we have φ′(s, a) ≥ 0 for any (s, a) ∈ S × A and Φ′K′ is nonsingular. Finally we normalize
all features such that ‖φ′(s, a)‖1 ≤ 1 while keeping φ
′(s, a) ≥ 0 for any (s, a) ∈ S × A. And
Assumption 1 holds for L = ‖(Φ′K)
−1‖∞.
C Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we present the formal proof of Theorem 2. In the following, we assume that all
features φ(s, a) are nonnegative, and Assumption 1 holds for all the time.
C.1 Notations
We define the following T -operators andQ functions:
[T V ](s) =
{
maxa∈A r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
TV, ∀s ∈ S1,
mina∈A r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
TV, ∀s ∈ S2,
[TπV ](s) = r(s, π(s)) + γP (·|s, π(s))
TV,
Qθ(i,j)(s, a) = r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)
Tw(i,j),
Qθ(i,j)(s, a) = r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
TVθ(i,j−1) .
For these T and Tπ operators, we have the following monotonicity and contraction property:
Proposition 1. For any value function V, V ′, if V ≤ V ′, we have
T V ≤ T V ′, TπV ≤ TπV
′
‖T V − T V ′‖∞ ≤ γ‖V − V
′‖∞, ‖TπV − TπV
′‖∞ ≤ γ‖V − V
′‖∞
for any strategy π. Furthermore, v∗ and V π are unique fixed points of T and Tπ , respectively, and
lim
t→∞
T tV = v∗, lim
t→∞
T tπV = v
π .
Next we use the following events to describe properties of our algorithm.
• Let G(i) to be the event
0 ≤ Vθ(i,0)(s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,0) ] (s) ≤ v
∗(s),
Vθ(i,0)(s) ≤
[
Tπ
θ(i,0)
Vθ(i,0)
]
(s),
v∗(s)− Vθ(i,0)(s) ≤
2−i
1− γ
;
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• E(i,0) to be the event of
‖w(i,0) − Φ−1K PKVθ(i,0)‖∞ ≤ ǫ1,
where w(i,0) = Φ−1K M
(i,0);
• E(i,j) to be the event of
‖w(i,j) − w(i,0) − Φ−1K PK(Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0))‖∞ ≤ Θ

L · 2−i
1− γ
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)
m1

 .
C.2 Preserving the Monotonicity
We first present several lemmas to establish some properties of T and Tπ
θ(i,j)
on Vθ(i,j) .
Lemma 3. Suppose G(i), E(i,0), · · · , E(i,j) holds. We have
0 ≤ Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,j′) ] (s) ≤ v
∗(s),
Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤
[
Tπ
θ(i,j
′)
Vθ(i,j′)
]
(s),
for ∀0 ≤ j′ ≤ j.
Proof. We prove this result by induction. When j′ = 0, these conditions already hold according to
the event G(i). Now assuming these conditions hold for j′ − 1 ≥ 0, we consider the case of j′.
According to the construction of Vθ(i,j′) ,
Vθ(i,j′)(s) = max
{
Vθ(i,j′−1)(s),max
a∈As
Qθ(i,j)(s, a)
}
≥ Vθ(i,j′−1)(s), ∀s ∈ S1,
Vθ(i,j′)(s) = max
{
Vθ(i,j′−1)(s), min
a∈As
Qθ(i,j)(s, a)
}
≥ Vθ(i,j′−1)(s), ∀s ∈ S2,
(18)
Hence for any s ∈ S, there are two cases:
1. Vθ(i,j′)(s) = Vθ(i,j′−1)(s). Then πθ(i,j′)(s) = πθ(i,j′−1)(s);
2. (a) Vθ(i,j′)(s) = maxaQθ(i,j′)(s, a) and πθ(i,j′) = argmaxa∈As Qθ(i,j′)(s, a) if s ∈ S1;
(b) Vθ(i,j′)(s) = minaQθ(i,j′)(s, a) and πθ(i,j′) = argmina∈As Qθ(i,j′)(s, a) if s ∈ S2.
In the first case, according to induction results and the monotonicity of T , Tπ , we have
Vθ(i,j′)(s) = Vθ(i,j′−1)(s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,j′−1) ](s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,j′) ](s)
Vθ(i,j′)(s) = Vθ(i,j′−1)(s) ≤
[
Tπ
θ(i,j
′
−1)
Vθ(i,j′−1)
]
(s) =
[
Tπ
θ(i,j
′)
Vθ(i,j′−1)
]
(s) ≤
[
Tπ
θ(i,j
′)
Vθ(i,j′)
]
(s)
In the second case, according to the event E(i,0), E(i,j
′), we obtain
‖w(i,j
′) − Φ−1K PKVθ(i,j′−1)‖∞
≤ ‖w(i,j
′) − w(i,0) − Φ−1K PK(Vθ(i,j′−1) − Vθ(i,0))‖∞ + ‖w
(i,0) − Φ−1K PKVθ(i,0)‖∞
≤ Θ

L · 2−i
1− γ
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)
m1

+ ǫ1
= ǫ(i),
which indicates that
w(i,j
′) − Φ−1K PKVθ(i,j′−1) = w
(i,j′) − ǫ(i) − Φ−1K PKVθ(i,j′−1) ≤ 0.
Since all features are nonnegative, we have the following inequality for ∀a ∈ As.
Qθ(i,j′)(s, a) = r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)
Tw(i,j
′) ≤ r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)TΦ−1K PKVθ(i,j′−1)
= r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TVθ(i,j′−1) = Qθ(i,j′)(s, a).
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Therefore, we have
Vθ(i,j′)(s) = max
a∈As
Qθ(i,j′)(s, a) ≤ max
a∈As
Qθ(i,j′)(s, a) = [T Vθ(i,j′−1) ] (s), if s ∈ S1;
Vθ(i,j′)(s) = min
a∈As
Qθ(i,j′)(s, a) ≤ min
a∈As
Qθ(i,j′)(s, a) = [T Vθ(i,j′−1) ] (s), if s ∈ S2;
Vθ(i,j′)(s) = Qθ(i,j′)(s, πθ(i,j′)(s)) ≤ Qθ(i,j′)(s, πθ(i,j′)(s)) =
[
Tπ
θ(i,j
′)
Vθ(i,j′−1)
]
(s).
Noticing Vθ(i,j′−1) ≤ Vθ(i,j′) and the monotonicity of T and Tπθ(i,j′−1)
, we have
Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,j′−1) ] (s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,j′) ] (s),
Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤
[
Tπ
θ(i,j
′
−1)
Vθ(i,j′)
]
(s).
Therefore, for all s ∈ S,
Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,j′) ] (s),
Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤
[
Tπ
θ(i,j
′
−1)
Vθ(i,j′)
]
(s).
Again according to the monotonicity of T , we have
Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤ [T Vθ(i,j′) ] (s) ≤
[
T 2Vθ(i,j′)
]
(s) ≤ · · · ≤ v∗(s).
This completes the induction.
Next, we will exhibit an approximate contraction property of our algorithm.
Lemma 4. If G(i), E(i,0), · · · , E(i,j) holds, then for 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j we have
v∗(s)− Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤ max
a∈As
[
γP (·|s, a)T (v∗ − Vθ(i,j′−1))
]
+ 2ǫ(i), ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. According to Algorithm 2,
w(i,j
′) = w(i,j
′) − ǫ(i) ≥ Φ−1K P
T
KVθ(i,j′−1) − 2ǫ
(i).
Using Vθ(i,j′−1) ≤ Vθ(i,j′) ≤ v
∗ in Lemma 3, we have for ∀s ∈ S1,
v∗(s)− Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤ v
∗(s)− max
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)Tw(i,j
′)
]
≤ v∗(s)− max
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T (Φ−1K P
T
KVθ(i,j′−1) − 2ǫ
(i))
]
= max
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)T v∗
]
− max
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T (Φ−1K P
T
KVθ(i,j′−1) − 2ǫ
(i))
]
≤ max
a∈As
[
γP (·|s, a)T v∗ − γP (·|s, a)TVθ(i,j′−1) + 2ǫ
(i)‖φ(s, a)‖1
]
≤ max
a∈As
[
γP (·|s, a)T (v∗ − Vθ(i,j′−1))
]
+ 2ǫ(i),
where the first inequality is due to Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≥ maxa∈As
[
r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)Tw(i,j
′)
]
, and the third
equality is due to the property of v∗. And for s ∈ S2, similarly we have
v∗(s)− Vθ(i,j′)(s) ≤ v
∗(s)− min
a∈As
[r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)Tw(i,j
′)]
≤ v∗(s)− min
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T (Φ−1K P
T
KVθ(i,j′−1) − 2ǫ
(i))
]
= min
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + P (·|s, a)T v∗
]
− min
a∈As
[
r(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T (Φ−1K P
T
KVθ(i,j′−1) − 2ǫ
(i))
]
≤ max
a∈As
[
γP (·|s, a)T v∗ − γP (·|s, a)TVθ(i,j′−1) + 2ǫ
(i)‖φ(s, a)‖1
]
≤ max
a∈As
[
γP (·|s, a)T (v∗ − Vθ(i,j′−1))
]
+ 2ǫ(i).
The proof is completed.
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C.3 Analysis of the Confidence Bounds
In this subsection, we analyze the confidence bound of sampling.
Lemma 5. For 0 ≤ i ≤ R′,
Pr
(
E(i,0), · · · , E(i,R)|G(i)
)
≤ 1−
δ
R′
Proof. Conditioned on G(i), we have
0 ≤ Vθ(i,0)(s) ≤ v
∗(s) ≤
1
1− γ
,
v∗(s)− Vθ(i,0)(s) ≤
2−i
1− γ
.
For any k ∈ [K] and δ ∈ (0, 1), according to Hoeffding inequality, with probability at least 1− δ,
|M (i,0)(k)− P (·|sk, ak)Vθ(i,0) | ≤ c1 ·max
s∈S
|Vθ(i,0) | ·
√
log[δ−1]
m
≤ c1 ·
1
1− γ
√
log[δ−1]
m
holds for some constant c1. If we switch δ into δ/(RR
′K), then we obtain
|M (i,0)(k)− P (·|sk, ak)Vθ(i,0) | ≤ ǫ1/L
holds with probability at least 1− δ/(RR′K). Next using the fact ‖ΦK‖∞ ≤ L and apply the union
bound for all k ∈ [K], we have
‖w(i,0) − Φ−1K PKVθ(i,0)‖∞ = ‖Φ
−1
K (M
(i,0) − PKVθ(i,0))‖∞ ≤ ǫ1
holds with probability at least 1− δ/(RR′). This indicates that E(i,0) holds with probability at least
1− δ/(RR′).
As for E(i,1), sinceM (i,1) = M (i,0) and w(i,1) = w(i,0), the event E(i,1) holds with probability 1.
For 2 ≤ j ≤ R, again using the Hoeffding inequality and the event G(i), we have
|M (i,j)(k)−M (i,0)(k)− P (·|sk, ak)
T (Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0)) |
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1m1
m1∑
l=1
(
Vθ(i,j−1)(x
(l)
k )− Vθ(i,0)(x
(l)
k )
)
− P (·|sk, ak)
T (Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ c1 max
s∈S
|Vθ(i,j−1)(s)− Vθ(i,0)(s)| ·
√
log(δ−1)
m1
≤ c1 max
s∈S
|v∗(s)− Vθ(i,0)(s)| ·
√
log(δ−1)
m1
≤ c1 ·
2−i
1− γ
√
log(δ−1)
m1
with probability at least 1 − δ. Since w(i,j) = Φ−1K M
(i,j), w(i,0) = Φ−1K M
(i,0), we switch δ into
δ/(RR′K) and apply the union bound for all k ∈ [K] to obtain that
‖w(i,j) − w(i,0) − Φ−1K PK(Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0))‖∞
= ‖Φ−1K
(
M (i,j) −M (i,0) − PK(Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0))
)
‖∞
≤ L · ‖M (i,j) −M (i,0) − PK(Vθ(i,j−1) − Vθ(i,0))‖∞
≤ Θ

L · 2−i
1− γ
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)
m1


holds with probability at least 1 − δ/(RR′). So is the probability of E(i,j) conditioned on G(i).
Applying the union bound for all E(i,0), E(i,1), E(i,2) · · · , E(i,R), we have
Pr
(
E(i,0), · · · , E(i,R)|G(i)
)
≤ 1−
δ
R′
,
which completes the proof.
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C.4 Analysis of the Error in the Next Iteration
Lemma 6. For ∀1 ≤ i ≤ R′, we have
Pr(G(i+1), E(i,0), · · · , E(i,R)|G(i)) ≥ 1−
δ
R′
.
Proof. Conditioned on G(i), suppose E(i,0), · · · , E(i,R) all hold. Using Lemma 4 for R times, there
exists a constant C such that
‖v∗ − Vθ(i,R)‖∞ ≤ max
s∈S,a∈A
[
γP (·|s, a)T (v∗ − Vθ(i,R−1))
]
+ 2ǫ(i)
≤ γ‖v∗ − Vθ(i,R−1)‖∞ + 2ǫ
(i)
≤ · · ·
≤ γR‖v∗ − Vθ(i,0)‖∞ + 2
R−1∑
j′=0
γj
′
ǫ(i)
≤
γR
1− γ
+
C
1− γ

 2−iL
1− γ
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)
m1
+
L
1− γ
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)
m

 ,
where the last inequality is due to events E(i,0), · · · , E(i,R) and ‖v∗−Vθ(i,0)‖∞ ≤ 1/(1−γ) accord-
ing to G(i). Hence if we choose
R = CR ·
log(1/(ǫ(1− γ)))
1− γ
, m = C1 ·
L2 log(R′RKδ−1)
ǫ2(1− γ)4
,
m1 = C2 ·
L2 log(R′RKδ−1)
(1 − γ)2
, ǫ ≤
2−i
1− γ
,
where CR, C1, C2 are constant numbers, we will have
‖v∗ − Vθ(i,R)‖∞ ≤
2−i−1
1− γ
.
Furthermore, since θ(i+1,0) = θ(i,R), the following inequalities
0 ≤ Vθ(i+1,0)(s) ≤ [T Vθ(i+1,0) ] (s) ≤ v
∗(s),
Vθ(i+1,0)(s) ≤
[
Tπ
θ(i+1,0)
Vθ(i+1,0)
]
(s)
v∗(s)− Vθ(i+1,0)(s) ≤
2−i−1
1− γ
hold according to Lemma 3. Hence the event G(i+1) holds when G(i), E(i,0), · · · , E(i,R) all hold.
Therefore, according to Lemma 5 we have proved that
Pr(G(i+1), E(i,0), · · · , E(i,R)|G(i)) ≥ 1−
δ
R′
.
C.5 Analysis of Approximation from Two Sides
Lemma 7. With probability at least 1 − δ, G(0),G(i), E(i−1,j) hold for ∀1 ≤ i ≤ R′, 0 ≤ j ≤ R
and Vθ(R′,R) is an ǫ-optimal value.
Proof. First of all, according to the initialization,
Vθ(0,0)(s) =
{
maxa∈As r(s, a) ≥ 0, if s ∈ S1,
mina∈As r(s, a) ≥ 0, if s ∈ S2.
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This indicates that
[T Vθ(0,0) ] (s) =
{
maxa∈As r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
TVθ(0,0) ≥ maxa∈As r(s, a) = Vθ(0,0)(s), if s ∈ S1,
mina∈As r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
TVθ(0,0) ≥ mina∈As r(s, a) = Vθ(0,0)(s), if s ∈ S2.
and [
Tπ
θ(0,0)
Vθ(0,0)
]
(s) = r(s, πθ(0,0)) + γP (·|s, πθ(0,0))Vθ(0,0)(s) ≥ r(s, πθ(0,0) ) = Vθ(0,0)(s).
According to the monotonicity of T ,
0 ≤ Vθ(0,0) ≤ T Vθ(0,0) ≤ · · · ≤ v
∗ ≤
1
1− γ
.
Hence G(0) always holds.
Next based on Lemma 6, we have
Pr(G(i), E(i−1,j), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ R′, 0 ≤ j ≤ R|G(0))
= Pr(G(i), E(i−1,j), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ R′ − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ R|G(0))Pr(G(R
′), E(R
′−1,0), · · · , E(R
′−1,R)|G(R
′−1))
≥ Pr(G(i), E(i−1,j), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ R′ − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ R|G(0)) · (1− δ/R′)
≥ Pr(G(i), E(i−1,j), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ R′ − 2, 0 ≤ j ≤ R|G(0)) · (1− δ/R′)2
≥ · · ·
≥ (1− δ/R′)R
′
≥ 1− δ.
If G(R
′) holds, then we obtain
‖v∗ − Vθ(R,R′)‖∞ ≤
2−R
′
1− γ
.
Hence when choosing R′ = Θ[log(ǫ−1(1− γ)−1)], we have
‖v∗ − Vθ(R,R′)‖∞ ≤ ǫ,
which indicates that Vθ(R,R′) is an ǫ-optimal value. Therefore, the event that Vθ(R,R′) is an ǫ-optimal
value, together with G(i), E(i,j), happens with probability at least 1− δ.
Next, we provide some notations and lemmas for the 2-TBSGM′. Suppose the equilibrium value
function ofM′ is v′. For η = {z(h)}Zh=1, we define
V ′η(s) =
{
maxh∈[Z]mina∈As
(
r′(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T z(h)
)
, ∀s ∈ S1,
maxh∈[Z]maxa∈As
(
r′(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T z(h)
)
, ∀s ∈ S2,
π′η(s) =
{
maxh∈[Z]
[
argmina∈As
(
r′(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T z(h)
)]
, ∀s ∈ S1,
maxh∈[Z]
[
argmaxa∈As
(
r′(s, a) + γφ(s, a)T z(h)
)]
, ∀s ∈ S2,
Wη(s) =
1
1− γ
− V ′η(s).
To describe the connection between values ofM andM′, we introduce the following lemma, whose
proof is obvious.
Lemma 8. v′(s) = 1/(1 − γ) − v(s). Any equilibrium strategy for M′ is also an equilibrium
strategy forM. And if ‖V ′η − v
′‖ ≤ ǫ, thenWη is an ǫ-optimal value.
Next we define events G(0),G
(i)
1 , E
(i−1,j)
1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ R
′, 0 ≤ j ≤ R similar to the case ofM.
• Let G
(i)
1 to be the event
0 ≤ V ′η(i,0) (s) ≤
[
T ′V ′η(i,0)
]
(s) ≤ v′(s),
V ′η(i,0) (s) ≤
[
T ′π′
η(i,0)
V ′η(i,0)
]
(s),
v′(s)− V ′η(i,0)(s) ≤
2−i
1− γ
,
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where T ′ and T ′π′ is defined as
[T ′V ′](s) =
{
mina∈As [r
′(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TV ], ∀s ∈ S1,
maxa∈As [r
′(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TV ], ∀s ∈ S2.
[T ′π′V
′](s) = r′(s, π′(s)) + γP (·|s, π′(s))TV ′, ∀s ∈ S.
(19)
This event is equivalent to the event
1
1− γ
≥Wη(i,0)(s) ≥
[
TWη(i,0)
]
(s) ≥ v∗(s),
Wη(i,0)(s) ≥
[
Tπ′
η(i,0)
Wη(i,0)
]
(s),
v∗(s)−Wη(i,0)(s) ≥
2−i
1− γ
;
• E
(i,0)
1 to be the event of
‖z(i,0) − Φ−1K PKV
′
η(i,0)‖∞ ≤ ǫ1;
• E
(i,j)
1 to be the event of
‖z(i,j) − z(i,0) − Φ−1K PK(V
′
η(i,j−1) − V
′
η(i,0))‖∞ ≤ Θ

L · 2−i
1− γ
√
log(RR′Kδ−1)
m1

 .
We present two following lemmas, which can be viewed as counterparts for W of Lemma 3 and
Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. Suppose G
(i)
1 , E
(i,0)
1 , · · · , E
(i,j)
1 holds. We have
1/(1− γ) ≥Wθ(i,j′)(s) ≥ [TWθ(i,j′) ] (s) ≥ v
∗(s),
Wθ(i,j′)(s) ≥
[
Tπ′
η(i,j
′)
Wθ(i,j′)
]
(s),
for ∀0 ≤ j′ ≤ j.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 3.
Lemma 10. With at least probability 1− δ, Algorithm 2 forM′ will output η(R,R
′) which satisfies
‖V ′
η(R,R′)
− v′‖ ≤ ǫ, together with events G
(0)
1 ,G
(i)
1 , E
(i−1,j)
1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ R
′, 0 ≤ j ≤ R.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 7.
Our next lemma indicates that if Vθ and Wη are both ǫ-optimal values, then the strategy obtained
from Algorithm 3 is an ǫ-optimal strategy.
Lemma 11. If Vθ(R′,R) and Wη(R′,R) are both ǫ-optimal values, where θ
(R′,R), η(R
′,R) are param-
eters obtained from Algorithm 2 with inputs M and M′, respectively. and G(0),G(i), E(i−1,j),
G
(0)
1 ,G
(i)
1 , E
(i−1,j)
1 all hold for ∀1 ≤ i ≤ R
′, 0 ≤ j ≤ R, then the strategy π = (π1, π2) output from
Algorithm 3 is an ǫ-optimal strategy.
Proof. We define the following operators mapping from value functions to value functions.
[Tmax,π2V ](s) =
{
maxa∈As [r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
T ]V, ∀s ∈ S1,
r(s, π2(s)) + γP (·|s, π2(s))
TV, ∀s ∈ S2,
[Tπ1,minV ](s) =
{
r(s, π1(s)) + γP (·|s, π1(s))
TV, ∀s ∈ S1,
mina∈As [r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)
T ]V, ∀s ∈ S2.
Then Tmax,π2 , Tπ1,min are both monotonic and contracting operators with contraction factor γ, and
it is easy to see that V π1,π2 , V π1,π2 are fixed points of T1, T2, respectively, where π1, π2 are optimal
counterstrategies against π2, π1.
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We next prove that V π1,π2 satisfies
v∗ ≤ V π1,π2 ≤Wη(R′,R) . (20)
According to Lemma 9, for any s ∈ S1, we have[
Tmax,π2Wη(R′,R)
]
(s) = max
a∈As
r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)TWη(R′,R) =
[
TWη(R′ ,R)
]
(s) ≤Wη(R′ ,R)(s),
and for any s ∈ S2, we have[
Tmax,π2Wη(R′ ,R)
]
(s) = r(s, π2(s)) + γP (·|s, π2(s))
TWη(R′ ,R)
=
[
Tπ′
η(R
′,R)
Wη(R′ ,R)
]
(s) ≤Wη(R′ ,R)(s).
These inequalities indicates that Tmax,π2Wη(R′,R) ≤Wη(R′ ,R) . Hence according to the monotonicity
of Tmax,π2 , we have V
π1,π2 ≤W
(R′,R)
η (s). Moreover, since π1 is an optimal counterstrategy against
π2, we have v
∗ ≤ V π1,π2 . The inequalities (20) has been proved.
Next noticing that ‖Wη(R′,R) − v
∗‖ ≤ ǫ, we have
‖V π1,π2 − v∗‖ ≤ ǫ.
Similarly we have ‖V π1,π2 − v∗‖ ≤ ǫ considering the operator Tπ1,min. These two inequalities
together indicate that π is an ǫ-optimal strategy.
C.6 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. According to Lemma 7 and 10, the event that Vθ(R,R′) ,Wη(R,R′) are both ǫ-
optimal values, together with events G(0),G(i), E(i,j),G
(0)
1 ,G
(i)
1 , E
(i,j)
1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ R
′, 0 ≤ j ≤ R,
happen with probability at least 1 − 2δ. Hence according to Lemma 11, the output π of Algorithm
3 is ǫ-optimal strategy with probability at least 1− 2δ. The total samples used in our algorithm is
2(R′RKm1 +R
′Km) = O˜
(
KL2
ǫ2(1 − γ)4
)
samples.
D Proof of Theorem 3
We first present a proposition indicating that an approximate optimal strategy ofM = (S,A, P, r, γ)
is also an approximate optimal strategy ofM′ = (S,A, P ′, r, γ).
Proposition 2. Suppose P, P˜ are two transition models such that
‖P (·|s, a)− P ′(·|s, a)‖TV ≤ ξ, ∀(s, a) ∈ S ×A.
Then for two 2-TBSGsM = (S,A, P, r, γ),M′ = (S,A, P ′, r, γ), if π is an ǫ-optimal strategy of
M, π is also an
(
2ξ
(1−γ)2 + 2ǫ
)
-optimal strategy ofM′.
Proof. Suppose π = (π1, π2), π1, π2 are optimal counterstrategies against π2, π1 inM, and π
′
1, π
′
2
are optimal counterstrategy against π2, π1 inM
′. We also assume that V, U are value functions of
M andM′, respectively.
According to the TV condition, for any strategy π we have
‖V π − Uπ‖∞ = ‖(I − γPπ)
−1rπ − (I − γP
′
π)
−1rπ‖∞
= ‖(I − γP ′π)
−1(γPπ − γP
′
π)(I − γPπ)
−1rπ‖∞
≤ ‖(I − γP ′π)
−1‖∞‖γPπ − γP
′
π‖∞‖(I − γPπ)
−1‖∞‖rπ‖∞
≤
1
1− γ‖P ′π‖∞
· ‖γPπ − γP
′
π‖∞ ·
1
1− γ‖Pπ‖∞
‖rπ‖∞
≤
ξ
(1− γ)2
,
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where the last inequality follows the facts
‖Pπ‖∞ = ‖P
′
π‖∞ = 1, ‖rπ‖∞ ≤ 1, ‖Pπ−P
′
π‖∞ = max
s∈S
‖P (·|s, π(s))−P ′(·|s, π(s))‖TV ≤ ξ.
Next, since π2, π
′
2 are optimal counterstrategies against π1 inM andM
′, we have
V π1,π2 ≤ V π1,π
′
2 , Uπ1,π2 ≥ Uπ1,π
′
2 .
Hence for any s ∈ S,
−
ξ
(1− γ)2
≤ V π1,π2(s)−Uπ1,π2 ≤ V π1,π2(s)−Uπ1,π
′
2(s) ≤ V π1,π
′
2(s)−Uπ1,π
′
2(s) ≤
ξ
(1− γ)2
,
which indicates that ∥∥∥V π1,π2 − Uπ1,π′2∥∥∥
∞
≤
ξ
(1 − γ)2
.
Similarly, we have ∥∥∥V π1,π2 − Uπ′1,π2∥∥∥
∞
≤
ξ
(1 − γ)2
.
Moreover, since π is an ǫ-optimal strategy ofM, we have
‖V π1,π2 − V π1,π2‖∞ ≤ ‖V
π1,π2 − v∗‖+ ‖V π1,π2 − v∗‖∞ ≤ 2ǫ,
where v∗ is the equilibrium value of M′. This inequality, together with above two inequalities,
indicates that ∥∥∥Uπ1,π′2 − Uπ′1,π2∥∥∥ ≤ 2ξ
(1 − γ)2
+ 2ǫ.
Next noting that
Uπ1,π
′
2 ≤ u∗ ≤ Uπ
′
1,π2 ,
where u∗ is the equilibrium value ofM′, we have∥∥∥Uπ1,π′2 − u∗∥∥∥
∞
≤
2ξ
(1 − γ)2
+ 2ǫ,
∥∥∥Uπ′1,π2 − u∗∥∥∥
∞
≤
2ξ
(1− γ)2
+ 2ǫ.
These two inequalities indicate that π is an
(
2ξ
(1−γ)2 + 2ǫ
)
-optimal strategy ofM′.
Proof of Theorem 3. Since Algorithm 1, 2 and 3 only sample from P (·|s, a) for (s, a) ∈ K, and P
and P ′ agree on K, the results of these algorithms executing on M = (S,A, P, r, γ) are same as
the results of these algorithms executing on M′ = (S,A, P ′, r, γ). According to Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2, with probability at least 1− δ, Algorithm 1 outputsw(R) such that πw(R) is an ǫ-optimal
strategy of M, and with probability at least 1 − 2δ, Algorithm 3 outputs an ǫ-optimal strategy π
ofM. Therefore, according to Proposition 2, πw(R) and π are
(
2ξ
(1−γ)2 + 2ǫ
)
-optimal strategies of
M′. The proof is completed.
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